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Counter-terrorism and counter-law: an archetypal critique 
 
Introduction 
 
Contemporary British counter-terrorist legislation is dominated by ‘counter-law’: using law 
against law, it systematically undermines the rule of law. This proposition will be 
substantiated by developing a detailed ‘archetypal’ account of the rule of law considered as a 
critical ideal. The rule of law will be identified with four tendencies in law—towards greater 
universality, knowability, followability and justifiability—and ‘counter-law’ with tendencies 
to block or reverse all of these. Counter-law tendencies in contemporary counter-terrorist 
legislation will be discussed in detail. This critique will also be related to contemporary 
debates on law and counter-law; it will be argued that critiques which relativise or historicise 
the liberal model of the rule of law fall short by failing to engage with it on its own terms, 
thereby undervaluing its utility as a normative resource. 
 
The first section engages with contemporary scholarship on threats to the rule of law; it notes 
that many authors relativise or problematise the liberal legal order, returning it to its historical 
context or focusing on its contradictions and blind spots, and advocates a fuller critical 
engagement with the rule of law. The second section expands on Richard Ericson’s concept 
of counter-law by developing a model of the rule of law as a critical ideal. Lon Fuller’s 
criteria for legal systems are synthesised to give four general demands: laws should be 
universal, knowable, followable and justifiable. The status of the rule of law and its elements 
as ideal-types is discussed, and Nigel Simmonds’ ‘archetype’ model is found to have greater 
normative and analytical power than Matthew Kramer’s ‘threshold’ model. The third section 
discusses terrorist offences, with particular reference to inchoate, preparatory and situational 
offences, while the fourth discusses the definition of terrorism in English law. It is argued 
that terrorist offences are structured, not to allow subjects to conform their own behaviour to 
the law, but to facilitate the pre-emptive interruption of loosely defined patterns of behaviour 
judged by experts to be undesirable. The fifth section discusses the range, significance and 
gravity of the departures from the rule of law that have been identified, considering some 
counter-arguments before drawing conclusions for policy-makers and legal scholars. 
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Legality and its critics: a call for rethinking 
 
A key concern in recent legal scholarship has been the articulation and defence of a liberal 
model of law, criminal law in particular. This model has been counterposed to developments 
perceived to threaten core liberal legal principles such as the presumption of innocence1. It is 
argued that, in the last two decades, there has been significant movement away from a 
realised liberal legal order—characterised by universal access to justice, practical equality of 
legal rights, effective procedural justice and retroactive sanctioning with at least some 
reference to desert—in the United Kingdom and perhaps more widely; and that this is a 
negative development, to be resisted or at least deplored. Substantial literatures have built up 
around broader trends within this movement: changing practices and principles of 
criminalization2; the challenges to the legal order posed by society’s responses to anti-social 
behaviour and ‘incivilities’3, on one hand, and terrorism and extremism4 on the other; the 
                                                 
1 M Blake and A Ashworth ‘The presumption of innocence in English criminal law’ [1996] 
CLR 306, A Ashworth ‘Four threats to the presumption of innocence’ (2006) 10(4) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 241, S Salako ‘Strict criminal liability: A 
violation of the Convention?’ (2006) 70 JCL 531, L Zedner ‘Security, the state and the 
citizen: The changing architecture of crime control’ (2010) 13 New CLR 379, A Ashworth 
‘The unfairness of risk-based possession offences’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
237, J Edwards ‘Coming clean about the criminal law’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 315. 
2 A Ashworth ‘Is the criminal law a lost cause?’ [2000] LQR 225, A Ashworth and L Zedner 
‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, 
and Sanctions’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21, D Husak Overcriminalization: The 
limits of the criminal law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), R Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall, M Renzo and 
V Tadros (eds.) The boundaries of the criminal law (hereafter Boundaries) (Oxford: OUP, 
2010), R Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall, M Renzo and V Tadros (eds.) Criminalization: The 
political morality of the criminal law (Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
3 A Ashworth ‘Social control and "anti-social behaviour": the subversion of human rights?’ 
[2004] LQR 263, S Macdonald ‘A suicidal woman, roaming pigs and a noisy trampolinist: 
Refining the ASBO’s definition of “anti-social behaviour”’ (2006) 69 MLR 183, G Pearson 
‘Hybrid law and human rights: Banning and behaviour orders in the appeal courts’ (2006) 27 
Liverpool LR 125, A Simester and A von Hirsch (eds.) Incivilities: Regulating offensive 
behaviour (London: Hart, 2006), C Bakalis ‘Asbos, “Preventative orders” and the European 
Court of Human Rights” [2007] European Human Rights LR 427, D Hewitt ‘Bovvered? A 
legal perspective on the ASBO’ (2007) 14 Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 355, P 
Squires ‘The politics of anti-social behaviour’ (2008) 3 British Politics 300, S Hoffman and S 
Macdonald ‘Should ASBOs be civilized?’ [2010] Crim LR 457 (and subsequent debate with 
P Ramsay). 
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innovations grouped under the heading of ‘preventive justice’5; and the executive-led 
undermining of legality by a countervailing trend of ‘counter-law’6 or the parallel 
development of ‘enemy criminal law’7. 
 
As this broader literature has developed, the liberal legal model has itself come under 
criticism. Five main lines of argument have been advanced. The historicist argument8 situates 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 L Donohue ‘Temporary permanence: The constitutional entrenchment of emergency 
legislation’ (1999) 1 Stanford JLS 36, P Roberts ‘The presumption of innocence brought 
home? Kebilene deconstructed’ [2002] LQR 41, J Waldron ‘Security and liberty: The image 
of balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 191, J Braithwaite ‘Pre-empting 
terrorism’ (2005) 17 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 96, V Tadros ‘Justice and Terrorism’ 
(2007) 10 New CLR 658, J Hodgson and V Tadros ‘How to make a terrorist out of nothing’ 
(2009) 72 MLR 984, J Virgo ‘Terrorism: Possession of articles’ [2008] Cambridge LJ 236, J 
McCulloch and S Pickering ‘Pre-crime and counter-terrorism: Imagining future crime in the 
‘War on Terror’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 628, S Macdonald ‘Understanding 
anti-terrorism policy: Values, rationales and principles’ (2012) 34 Sydney LR 317, V Ramraj, 
M Hor, K Roach and G Williams (eds.) Global anti-terrorism law and policy (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2012), E Cape ‘The counter-terrorism provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012: preventing misuse or a case of smoke and mirrors?’ [2013] CLR 385, A Greene ‘The 
quest for a satisfactory definition of terrorism: R v Gul’ (2014) 77 MLR 780, L Zedner 
‘Terrorizing criminal law’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 99. 
5 P Robinson ‘Punishing dangerousness: Cloaking preventive detention as criminal justice’ 
(2001) 114 Harvard LR 1429, C Slobogin ‘A jurisprudence of dangerousness’ (2003) 98 
Northwestern University LR 1, E Janus ‘The preventive state, terrorists and sexual predators: 
Countering the threat of a new outsider jurisprudence’ (2004) 40 Crim L Bulletin 576, L 
Zedner ‘Pre-crime and post-criminology?’ (2007) 11 Theoretical Criminology 261, D Husak 
‘Lifting the cloak: Preventive detention as punishment (2011) 48  San Diego LR 1173, L 
Alexander and K Ferzan ‘Danger: The ethics of pre-emptive action’ (2012) 9 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 637, A Ashworth, L Zedner and P Tomlin (eds.) Prevention and the 
limits of the criminal law (hereafter Prevention) (Oxford: OUP, 2013), A Ashworth and L 
Zedner Preventive justice (Oxford: OUP, 2014), K Ferzan ‘Preventive justice and the 
presumption of innocence’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 505. 
6 R Ericson Crime in an insecure world (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); see also R Levi ‘Making 
counter-law: On having no apparent purpose in Chicago’ (2009) 49 British Journal of 
Criminology 131, B Bowling and J Sheptycki Global Policing (London: Sage, 2011). 
7 G Jakobs ‘Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht’ (2004) 5 HRR-Strafrecht 88; see also M 
Dubber ‘Citizenship and penal law’ 13 New CLR 190, Zedner, above n 1, S Macdonald 
‘Cyberterrorism and Enemy Criminal Law’ in Ohlin, Finkelstein and Govern (eds.) Cyber 
War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford: OUP, 2015). 
8 L Farmer Making the modern criminal law (Oxford: OUP, 2016) (hereafter Making), N 
Lacey In search of criminal responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2016) (hereafter In search); see also 
N Lacey ‘Space, time and function: intersecting principles of responsibility across the terrain 
of criminal justice’ (2007) 1 Criminal law and philosophy 233, N Lacey ‘Philosophy, 
political morality and history: Explaining the enduring resonance of the Hart-Fuller Debate’ 
(2008) 83 New York Universlity LR 1059, L Farmer ‘Criminal wrongs in historical 
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the liberal legal model within its—relatively brief—historical moment: by dethroning the 
model as we currently understand it from the heaven of concepts9, historicist critics aim to 
call into question both the taken-for-granted virtues of the model and the assumption that any 
deviation from it must be challenged as such (although these developments may be 
challenged on other normative grounds10). Second, a dialectical argument11, building on the 
historicist approach, grounds the liberal legal model in a particular socio-political conjuncture 
and argues that the liberalism of the model is internally incoherent, so that it is incapable of 
being universalised. According to this argument, the liberal model harbours its own 
contradiction within it, and is ultimately inconceivable without it; what are perceived as 
deviations from the model may express the model’s own inherent tendencies or fallibilities. 
 
The third and fourth are variants on a pluralist argument, which concedes that the liberal 
legal model may provide an appropriate normative framework for the workings of the law, 
but stresses that the law is only one of several, more or less interdependent, regulatory 
systems. The descriptive variant of this argument12 asserts that social order in advanced 
societies is produced both through the law and through regulatory systems not mediated 
                                                                                                                                                       
perspective’ in Duff et al Boundaries, above n 2, L Farmer ‘Criminal law as an institution’ in 
Duff et al Criminalization, above n 2. 
9 R von Jhering ‘In the heaven for legal concepts: A fantasy’ ([1884] 1985) 58 Temple LQ 
799. 
10 Lacey cites “ideals of equality, legality and human rights” as grounds for critiquing 
contemporary developments; Lacey In search, above n 8, p 192. 
11 This position is particularly associated with Peter Ramsay. See P Ramsay ‘Pashukanis and 
public protection’ in M Dubber (ed.) Foundational texts in criminal law (Oxford: OUP, 
2014). Also: P Ramsay ‘The responsible subject as citizen: Criminal law, democracy and the 
welfare state’ (2006) 69 MLR 29, P Ramsay ‘Overcriminalization as vulnerable citizenship' 
(2010) 13 New CLR 262, P Ramsay ‘Preparation offences, security interests, political 
freedom’ in R Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall, M Renzo and V Tadros (eds.) The structures of 
the criminal law (Oxford: OUP, 2011), P Ramsay The Insecurity State: Vulnerable autonomy 
and the right to security in the criminal law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), P Ramsay ‘Democratic 
limits to preventive criminal law' in Ashworth et al Prevention, above n 5, P Ramsay ‘The 
dialogic community at dusk’ (2014) 1 Critical Analysis of Law 316. An analogous challenge 
to the vocabulary of ‘exception’ and ‘normality’ has been mounted by radical critics of 
international law; see e.g. M Neocleous ‘The problem with normality: Taking exception to 
“permanent emergency” (2006) 31 Alternatives 191. 
12 J Braithwaite ‘The new regulatory state and the transformation of criminology’ (2000) 40 
British Journal of Criminology 222, J Braithwaite ‘What’s wrong with the sociology of 
punishment?’ (2002) 7 Theoretical Criminology 5, P Gill ‘Policing and regulation: What is 
the difference?’ (2002) 11 Social and Legal Studies 523, A Crawford ‘“Contractual 
governance” of deviant behaviour’ (2003) 30 Journal of law and society 479, C Parker, C 
Scott, N Lacey and J Braithwaite (eds.) Regulating law (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
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through law. A critical variant focuses on policing in particular, arguing that policing as a 
domain of regulation is ‘unconstrained not only by principles of law, and of legitimacy, but 
by principles of any kind’13. Lastly, a more sceptical regulationist argument has it that law is, 
simply, one regulatory system among others, to be judged only by its effectiveness in 
producing sustainable social order: the regulationist has no investment in the liberal legal 
model, or any other normative model14. 
 
These arguments can be seen to overlap, and in practice critiques of the liberal model may 
draw on two or three of them. However, it is not clear that all five are consistent with one 
another; in particular, the dialectical and critical pluralist arguments engage (however 
critically) with a normativity which is bracketed or ignored by the other three. Moreover, 
these arguments make only a qualified challenge to the normative standing of the liberal 
model. The regulationist argument merely sidesteps it, establishing that other criteria of 
effectiveness are available. The dialectical and critical pluralist arguments problematise the 
model by arguing that it and its opposite are mutually implicated, whether its opposite is 
considered as internal to it or as a ‘police’ model existing alongside it. These arguments call 
for awareness of the areas that the putatively universal liberal order omits to cover, while also 
suggesting that such lacunae may be intrinsic to the model. Thus, to speak of ‘citizens’ who 
have ‘rights’ is always to invoke non-citizens who are denied those rights15; this recognition 
forecloses the possibility of celebrating citizenship rights as an absolute and unqualified 
good16. The historicist and descriptive pluralist arguments for their part relativise the 
                                                 
13 M Dubber ‘Preventive justice: The quest for principle’, in Ashworth et al Prevention, 
above n 5, p 65 (emphasis in original); compare “Policing in the world system is not under 
‘rule-of-law’, nor is it ‘rule-by-law’ but rather ‘rule with law’.” Bowling and Sheptycki, 
above n 6, p 130 (emphasis in original). See also W Stuntz ‘The pathological politics of 
criminal law’ (2001) 100 Michigan Law Review 505, M Dubber and M Valverde (eds.) The 
new police science: The police power in domestic and international governance (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), M Dubber ‘Criminal law between public and private law’ 
in Duff et al Boundaries, above n 2. 
14 “[N]ot only is regulation not just law in that it extends well beyond courts and legal 
instruments, regulationists are just not concerned with law in that they are not concerned with 
whether or not law is correct in seeing itself as characterised by unity, coherence or particular 
modes of reasoning, or explaining itself in these or any other terms.” J Black ‘Critical 
reflections on regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1 (emphasis in 
original). 
15 “for rights to have meaning ... there must be groups without rights, so that the difference 
between rights and non-rights can be appreciated”: B Hudson Justice in the Risk Society 
(London: Sage, 2003), pp 181-2. 
16 On this point see Dubber, above n 7. 
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normative model by localising it within a particular social and historical setting. To relativise 
the presumption of innocence, for example—establishing that it is broadly irrelevant in 
business regulation, and/or that it had no role in criminal justice until relatively recently—
would be fatal to any argument grounded in the timeless and universal value of that principle. 
 
These arguments have limited purchase on the model’s normative value, however. 
Demanding rights for non-citizens does not preclude protesting at encroachments on rights 
that have been accorded to citizens, including through the affirmation of their (admittedly 
circumscribed) universality. Similarly, where the presumption of innocence does obtain, 
resisting its erosion is not necessarily mere conservatism or parochialism. Where norms have 
been used to guide practice and constrain the executive, those norms retain their power as 
critical standards which can be asserted against lawless power. Generally, the assumption that 
to make a normative claim is to assert an absolute—and hence that to relativise a principle is 
to deprive it of any claim to our normative consideration—is unwarranted. There is a risk of 
illusions of Olympian detachment, paradoxically, in the adoption of relativising perspectives: 
to name a value as having been current in debates within the community of legal scholars in 
the early twenty-first century is not, in itself, sufficient to remove oneself and one’s audience 
from that setting. Norms recognised as such within a discursive community, particularly a 
community structured through continuing professionalised practice and reflection on practice, 
may serve as a critical resource for members of that community, even after reflection on the 
historical and functional specificity of their current usage. 
 
The challenge for these critics is to relativise and problematise, not only the existence of 
norms of liberal legality, but the norms themselves, while giving their normative power its 
due. Given the capacity of these norms to constrain, as well as structure and legitimate, 
exercises of executive power, this stance is likely to entail at least a qualified defence of 
elements of those norms. This paper aims to contribute to such a critique, bringing Ericson’s 
‘counter-law’ model into dialogue with scholarship on the rule of law, and proposing a 
reading of the rule of law which situates it as a critical ideal.  
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Thresholds, archetypes and the problem of counter-law 
 
Ericson introduces ‘counter-law’ by defining the law as ‘a liberal institution that holds 
accountable those who intentionally cause harm’17; elsewhere he defines the rule of law as 
the idea that individuals ‘should know what is and is not legally authorized ... to ensure a 
predictable environment in which to make rational choices about rule-governed behavior’18. 
While the rule of law is associated with classical liberalism, Ericson argues, the rise of 
‘neo-liberal social imaginaries’ has prioritised ‘the precautionary urge for certainty’19; this 
elevates pre-emptive harm prevention above the rule of law. The result is ‘counter-law’, 
which takes two forms: the enactment of ‘laws against law’ (counter-law I) and the creation 
of ‘surveillant assemblages’ (counter-law II). In both cases the goal is to pre-empt perceived 
threats by using the powers of the criminal justice system in coercive and incapacitatory 
ways. To make this possible, both forms of counter-law ‘erode or eliminate traditional 
principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law’20. Counter-law thus describes 
situations where legal powers are used to circumvent legal standards and principles, seen as 
obstacles to the safeguarding of power or public safety. 
 
Conceiving counter-law as a tendency working against the realisation of the ideal of the rule 
of law enables us to define it more systematically. We can take as a starting-point Fuller’s 
‘morality of law’: the argument that laws, as well as existing, should be publicised, 
prospective, understandable, non-contradictory, compliable with, reasonably unchanging over 
time and congruent with their own official administration21. Fuller’s criteria can be recast as 
three broad principles. Firstly, laws should be equally applied to all: to say that the law in a 
certain jurisdiction requires one group of actions and prohibits another is to say that every 
individual within the jurisdiction is subject to these requirements and prohibitions, and no 
others. Secondly, laws should be knowable: it should be possible for an individual to 
establish what the law requires in a given situation, and to understand those requirements. 
This requirement of itself implies that the law should be comprehensive: there can be no area 
of social life to which the law does not apply and where it thus cannot be known. Since no set 
                                                 
17 Ericson, above n 6, p 20. 
18 R Ericson ‘Rules in policing: Five perspectives’ (2007) 11(3) Theoretical Criminology 
367, p 368. 
19 Ericson, above n 6, pp 7, 25. 
20 Ericson, above n 6, p 24. 
21 L Fuller The morality of law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p 39. 
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of rules can cover every possible eventuality, the law as a system must have comprehensible 
coherence, so that it can reasonably and consistently be interpreted and extended when 
necessary. 
 
Thirdly, laws must be followable. Followability requires knowability: it is not possible to 
follow a law that one cannot identify or cannot understand. Further, it is not possible to 
follow a law that demands the impossible, or a law that has changed since one first tried to 
follow it. Followability also implies that it should be possible to choose to follow a law. This 
is an assumption about the subjects governed by law as well as about the law itself: laws in 
this understanding take the form of ‘general norms directed at, and capable of being 
understood and followed by, persons deemed to possess the necessary capacities’22. The 
subjects of law are conceived, crucially, as free: to be followable, laws may not structure 
social life to the point where no margin of choice remains. Nigel Simmonds argues that this 
association between followability and freedom to shape one’s own life is fundamental to the 
rule of law: ‘wherever the rule of law exists to any extent at all, citizens will enjoy some 
zones of optional conduct that are protected from the interference of others’23. Thus we 
cannot say that we are living under the rule of law if our every action is determined by 
direction from others (even others who are enforcing formally valid laws), as in such a 
situation there is no undirected area of conduct left to be governed by law. 
 
A fourth set of demands (not explicitly stressed by Fuller) follows from the second and third. 
Given that individuals choose to follow laws, it must be possible to justify a law: to give 
some explanation of a law which will motivate a rational hearer to follow it. However, 
reasonable people can disagree, and reasonable people (even in authority) can be mistaken: if 
a law can be justified it must also be possible for it to be rationally challenged, and for the 
challenge to succeed. As Jeremy Waldron argues, this criterion of justifiability—and the 
demand for procedural justice which it grounds—is itself intimately associated with the value 
of liberty: to present the rule of law merely as a system of clear and precise rules would be to 
‘truncate what the Rule of Law[sic] rests upon: respect for the freedom and dignity of each 
                                                 
22 Farmer Making, above n 8, pp 167-8. 
23 N Simmonds Law as a moral idea (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp 141-2. 
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person as an active center of intelligence.’24. If laws are to govern free and presumptively 
rational citizens, they must be both rationally arguable and practically open to challenge25. 
 
In short, to say that a society exists under the rule of law is to make four claims about its 
laws. First, laws are universal: they apply equally and without exemption. Second, laws are 
knowable: it is possible to find out what laws exist and possible to understand them; there is 
no area of life outside or above the law; and laws coherently express general principles which 
make it possible to extend the law to cover new situations. Third, laws are followable: laws 
do not demand the impossible, nor do they remove any margin of choice. Fourth, laws are 
justifiable: it is possible both to explain laws and to make reasoned challenges to them, which 
have a chance of being effective. 
  
The four demands sketched above do not constitute a coherent Weberian ideal-type, although 
any one of them alone might be developed into one. A system of laws that was perfectly 
universal might (in theory) be achieved by elaborating the law to levels of Borgesian 
comprehensiveness, with guidance for every detail of every individual’s life. A system of 
laws that was perfectly knowable, by contrast, could be achieved by replacing the law with a 
handful of general precepts (“As far as possible, do no harm”), which could be regularly 
advertised to the populace. A perfectly followable scheme of laws could be achieved by 
abolishing every offence which had ever been the subject of a contested trial, leaving only 
those prohibitions which society had shown itself to find unproblematic. A perfectly 
justifiable system, finally, would replace every sentencing decision with an open-ended 
debate of the type canvassed in Nils Christie’s proposal for ‘neighbourhood courts’26. 
 
Whether these ideal-types, taken individually, are ideals in the normative sense is debatable. 
Certainly, as Matthew Kramer notes, the conjoined maximal realisation of each of Fuller’s 
                                                 
24 J Waldron ‘The concept and the rule of law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1, p 60. 
25 Compare: “If the rule of law is to serve as an effective protection against arbitrary 
intervention, the right to challenge is particularly important in cases where the stakes for 
individual liberty are high.” Ashworth and Zedner, above n 5, p 265. 
26 “If the offender is well educated, ought he then to suffer more, or maybe less, for his sins? 
Or if he is black, or if he is young, or if the other party is an insurance company, or if his wife 
has just left him, or if his factory will break down if he has to go to jail, or if his daughter will 
lose her fiance, or if he was drunk, or if he was sad, or if he was mad? There is no end to it. 
And maybe there ought to be none.” N Christie ‘Conflicts as property’ (1977) 17 British 
Journal of Criminology 1, p 8. 
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principles is not conceivable27. This question regarding the status of Fuller’s criteria relates 
back to Hart’s controversy with Fuller. Hart argued, with varying emphases, that ‘intelligent 
decisions’ could be taken with reference to some agreed ‘standard of criticism’ without the 
standard being a moral one28; that ‘the notion of efficiency for a purpose’ should not be 
confused with ‘those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its 
various forms is concerned’29; and that moral status might be granted to criteria like those set 
out by Fuller, if it were granted that this morality was ‘compatible with very great iniquity’30. 
What is consistent throughout Hart’s differing formulations is the argument that, while 
Fuller’s criteria may describe the minimum prerequisites of a functioning legal order, they 
are in effect technical rather than moral virtues (a morality ‘compatible with very great 
iniquity’ is a morality in name only). 
 
Following Hart, Kramer grants the utility of Fuller’s criteria as threshold conditions for the 
existence of the rule of law, but argues that once this threshold is met the question of closer 
compliance to an ideal legal system does not apply.  
 
Above that [threshold] level, up to some considerably higher point, any further 
compliance with each principle will enhance the clarity and robustness of the status of 
a legal system as such but will not be indispensable for the very applicability of that 
status.31 
 
If legality is a threshold property, as Kramer argues, it is not a matter of degree but a quality 
which is either absent or present. Defects of universality, knowability, followability and 
justifiability will only reflect on the overall legal order if the lacunae they introduce are so 
extensive that the rule of law ceases to obtain; this in turn will only be the case at the point 
where the normalisation of exceptional measures has proceeded so far that laws in general are 
                                                 
27 The criteria ‘do not all coherently fit together when they are understood as ideals that 
collectively form an archetype of perfection’. M Kramer Objectivity and the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p 109. 
28 H Hart ‘Positivism and the separation of law and morals’ (1957) 71 Harv LR 593, p 613. 
29 H Hart ‘Book Review: “The Morality of Law”’ 78 Harv LR 1281, p 1286. On this 
formulation see J Waldron ‘Positivism and legality: Hart’s equivocal response to Fuller’ 
(2008) 83 NYU LR 1135. See also Lacey ‘Philosophy, political morality and history’, above 
n 8. 
30 H Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1961] 2012), p 207. 
31 Kramer, above n 27, p 109. 
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particularistic, unknowable, unfollowable and/or unchallengeable32. Short of that dystopian 
point, the worst that these defects can do is reduce the clarity with which the rule of law is 
identifiable as operating. This lack of clarity may in turn be justified by an appeal to other 
values, even non-legal values such as security or efficiency. 
 
The effect of the ‘threshold’ model is thus to disable the ‘counter-law’ critique by dividing it 
in two. At the point where deviations from Fuller’s criteria are so great as to impair the 
operation of the legal system, a technical critique can be mounted, inasmuch as sufficiently 
gross defects will prevent the legal system from functioning at all. Where defects do not rise 
to that level, critiques based on Fuller’s criteria are based on a freestanding morality and have 
no grounding in the nature of law. 
 
Conversely, Simmonds presents the model and its relation to reality in terms of an archetype:  
 
To count as an instance of law, a regime must approximate to the archetype to some 
degree: it must, so to speak, participate in the form of law. Yet the very fact that such 
participation can be instantiated to varying degrees means that the archetype can 
nevertheless constitute a guiding ideal to which legal systems ought to strive to 
conform more closely.33 
 
Fuller’s criteria should be understood as sketching out the key features of an approach to 
governing human societies—an ideal to which real systems of law may approximate more or 
less closely. Notably, Simmonds also suggests that ‘the possibility of revision is inherent in 
any statement of a guiding archetype’34: to understand the rule of law as an archetype brings 
with it the necessity of a process of reflective revision, and the recognition that any 
institutional implementation of the rule of law is likely to be imperfect. The archetype offers 
guidance for the development of the law; the law in this sense is ‘the process of its own 
                                                 
32 On ‘normalisation’ see P Waddington ‘Slippery slopes and civil libertarian pessimism’ 
(2005) 15 Policing and Society 353 and D Haubrich ‘Anti-terrorism laws and slippery slopes: 
A reply to Waddington’ (2006) 16 Policing and Society 405. 
33 Simmonds, above n 23, p 99. 
34 Ibid., p 145. 
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becoming’35. Although never fully achieved, the rule of law represents an end-point towards 
which progress can always be made36. 
 
The archetypal model, Simmonds argues, centres on ‘the idea of a domain of universality and 
necessity in human affairs, providing a degree of independence from the power of others’37. 
To say that the rule of law exists is to say that ‘domains of liberty that are independent of the 
will of anyone’38 have been secured, more or less effectively, by law39. Hence, the more fully 
the rule of law is realised—which is partly, but not exclusively, a matter of conformity to 
Fuller’s criteria—the more fully the law guarantees individual freedom. Autonomy is the core 
value, to be maximised by the operation of laws approximating to Fuller’s criteria; indeed, 
there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between law and (a certain form of) autonomy.40  
 
The ‘threshold’ and ‘archetype’ models can also be distinguished by their response to the 
relativising critiques discussed above. Lacey notes that the rule of law was recognised as an 
ideal long before it was feasible to realise Fuller’s requirements of publicity and congruence 
with official action41. The threshold model would concede this point, but at the cost of 
challenging historical actors’ self-understanding, denying the name of ‘rule of law’ to 
formulations of that concept which did not meet Fulleran criteria. Lacey argues for some 
continuity over time, but only at the level of  ‘a modest and formal conception of the rule of 
law’, denoting social arrangements ‘with the dual capacity to constrain or temper and hence 
legitimize power’42. The ‘archetype’ model offers the possibility of a fuller picture of the 
normative development of the rule of law, situating changing conceptions within an 
overarching conceptual framework without according any privilege to the present day; a 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p 11. 
36 Cf Dyzenhaus: “[o]ne assumes its truth to bring the legal order closer to the ideals which 
underpin it.” D Dyzenhaus ‘The state of emergency in legal theory’, in Ramraj et al, above n 
4, p 84. 
37 Simmonds, above n 23, p 195. 
38 Ibid, p 142. 
39 Compare Farmer: “The principle of individual autonomy also demands respect for a sphere 
within which individuals can develop their own life choices”. Farmer Making, above n 8, p 
113. 
40 “The commitment to what we might call the modality of law, however imperfectly realized 
in practice, both shapes and constrains the way that certain ends can be brought about and, 
arguably, also entails a commitment to a certain form of human agency”. Farmer Making, 
above n 8, p 24. 
41 Lacey In search, above n 8, p 198. 
42 Lacey ‘Philosophy, political morality and history’, above n 8, pp 1086 and 1078. 
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world in which individuals appear before the law as autonomous moral agents ‘has arguably 
never existed’43 in fully realised form, any more than (for example) a fully realised 
democracy. The rule of law in archetypal perspective is thus “the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules”44, considered as a long-term project and one very 
far from adequate realisation. This model presents the rule of law not only as a normative 
standard but as a socially-recognised ideal, and as such lends itself to the classification both 
of existing legal orders and of movements towards or away from the rule of law.  
 
The archetypal model also enables us to understand counter-law in terms of the selective 
suspension or reversal of that project. To the extent that counter-law is an active tendency, we 
might then expect to see four counter-trends to the realisation of the rule of law. Against 
universality, counter-law offers selectivity: selective criminalisation systematically subjects 
some groups more effectively than others to the coercive powers of the criminal justice 
system. Against knowability, counter-law offers laws designed to be targeted retrospectively: 
laws that can be used to criminalise but cannot be used by individuals to guide their 
behaviour. Against followability, counter-law limits the domain of free choice, either by 
directly controlling behaviour or by loading individuals with positive obligations. Against 
justifiability, counter-law offers laws drafted so broadly—and, on occasion, procedures 
controlled so tightly—as to be beyond the scope of effective appeal, taking these offences 
outside the circuit of challenge, review and revision. The effect of these conjoined tendencies 
is to attack the values of individual autonomy and moral agency, annulling the ‘domains of 
liberty’ within which individuals should be able to pursue their own life plans. 
 
Situation, preparation, inchoation: problematic trends in counter-terrorism 
 
The new criminal offences introduced by the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006 exemplify the 
development of counter-law. Three types of offence are discussed below: inchoate offences, 
preparatory offences and situational offences; all of these fall into the larger family of 
preventive offences identified in Ashworth and Zedner’s typology45. These offences all tend 
to dissociate counter-terrorism from criminal law’s standard requirement for ‘a clear illegal 
                                                 
43 Lacey In search, above n 8, p 164. 
44 Fuller, above n 21, p 96 and passim. 
45 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 5, pp 96-102. 
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act that is committed with fault’46, focusing instead on a pattern of behaviour identified as 
undesirable. The importance of the offences under discussion in contemporary counter-
terrorist criminal justice is hard to overstate. The Crown Prosecution Service Website lists 
155 successful counter-terrorist successful prosecutions between the passage of the Terrorism 
Act 2006 and the end of calendar year 2016, involving the bringing of 391 charges of which 
345 were brought to conviction47. The specifically counter-terrorist charges brought in these 
cases—all of which can be classified as inchoate, preparatory or situational—account for 
66% of all charges brought; much of the remainder is accounted for by general inchoate and 
situational offences (e.g. conspiracy and possession offences, respectively). 
 
Inchoate offences criminalise acts oriented to achieving a wrongful end, where those acts are 
incomplete or unsuccessful. The term is here being used to cover both general inchoate 
offences (attempt, conspiracy and encouragement or assistance) and statutory offences 
defined in the inchoate mode48. The inchoate offence type which has seen the most 
counter-terrorist legislative innovation is encouragement. Under the Terrorism Act 2006 it is 
an offence to publish a statement which ‘glorifies’ the commission or preparation of acts of 
terrorism (in the past, in future or generally), in such a way as to portray those acts as worthy 
of emulating, if the person doing so either intends that the audience should be encouraged to 
commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism as a result or is reckless as to this possibility 
(Terrorism Act 2006, s1). It is also an offence to distribute or circulate any publication which 
is likely either to encourage carrying out acts of terrorism or to offer practical assistance in 
doing so; again, this is the case whether the publications are circulated intentionally or merely 
recklessly, with respect to their likely effect (Terrorism Act 2006, s2). 
 
Three points should be noted here. Firstly, in the case of the s1 ‘glorification’ offence the 
encouragement may be indirect and/or incomplete: thanks to the ‘instigate’ clause, those 
encouraged need not be encouraged to commit terrorist acts themselves, even with the 
Terrorism Act 2000’s expansive definition of terrorist acts to include threats. If A makes a 
‘terrorist’ threat after being encouraged to do so by B, who had previously read material in 
praise of terrorist acts circulated by C, C may be found guilty of a terrorist offence (with a 
                                                 
46 K Roach ‘The criminal law and terrorism’, in Ramraj et al, above n 4, p 137. 
47 Crown Prosecution Service ‘Successful prosecutions since the end of 2006’ (2017), online 
at <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd.html#a02>; last accessed 6/7/2017. 
48 Referred to as ‘substantive-inchoate’ offences in Roberts, above n 4. 
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maximum sentence of seven years)49. Secondly, in criminalising reckless conduct, both the 
‘glorification’ offence and the ‘encouragement’ arm of the s2 publication offence go beyond 
more usual definitions of encouragement to commit an offence50. Although the recklessness 
required by the s1 and s2 offences is subjective51—so that the offence requires knowingly 
disregarding a substantial risk of encouraging terrorist activity—the burden remains on the 
defence to demonstrate that the statement made or material circulated did not have her 
endorsement, a non-endorsement which in practical terms is likely to require a positive action 
(i.e. the furnishing of appropriate disclaimers at the time a document is circulated).  
 
Thirdly, not only do these offences not require that any terrorist action (or instigation) takes 
place as a result of the publication or circulation; they do not require that ‘any person ... is in 
fact encouraged’ (Terrorism Act 2006 s2(8)). The publication and circulation offences are 
doubly inchoate: not only is there no need for any individual to be successfully ‘encouraged’ 
to the point of attempting a terrorist act; there is no need for the publication or circulation to 
succeed in producing the state of ‘encouragement’ in any individual. The conceptual horizon 
of terrorist offences thus extends back in time and down the scale of severity, identifying 
‘terrorism’ as a culpable pattern of activity rather than in terms of any readily identifiable 
harm done or prohibition breached. In terms of severity, the definition explicitly includes acts 
which were not only harmless but had no wrongful intent. In temporal terms, the offence is 
the publication rather than the possible subsequent encouragement, let alone any action which 
might have been encouraged. The logic seems to be that a pattern of behaviour identifiable as 
‘terrorism’ is afoot, which should be interrupted by criminalising anything associated with it. 
 
Preparatory offences, secondly, go even further than inchoate offences in extending the 
scope of criminal liability back in time and down the scale of harm. The term is being used 
here to cover statutory offences which consist of undertaking activity—which may in itself be 
both harmless and legal—in preparation for a distinct future criminal act52. Thus the 
                                                 
49 Multiply-inchoate offences of this type are discussed in Macdonald ‘Understanding anti-
terrorism policy’, above n 4, and Macdonald ‘Cyberterrorism’, above n 7. 
50 Both the former common law offence of incitement and the ‘encouragement or assistance’ 
offences created by the Serious Crime Act 2007 (ss. 44-46) require that the defendant either 
intended an offence to be committed as a result of her action or believed that this would be 
the result. 
51 Established in Faraz v R. [2012 EWCA Crim 2820]. 
52 Ashworth and Zedner refer to these offences as ‘preparatory or pre-inchoate’; Ashworth 
and Zedner, above n 5, pp 98-9. Ramsay’s discussion of ‘preinchoate offences’ in 
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Terrorism Act 2000 criminalises training in weapons and explosives—provisions expanded 
under the Terrorism Act 2006 to include training in ‘the design or adaptation for the purposes 
of terrorism ... of any method or technique for doing anything’ (Terrorism Act 2006 s6(3)(c)), 
a formulation which at least has the merit of leaving little work for future legislators. The 
most frequently used preparatory offence in this area—and the one which most vividly 
illustrates the extension of the scope of counter-terrorist legislation—is ‘Preparation of 
terrorist acts’, also introduced in the 2006 Act (Terrorism Act 2006 s5). If an individual has 
the intention of either committing or assisting a terrorist act, ‘any conduct in preparation for 
giving effect to his intention’ can constitute an offence, potentially carrying a life sentence. 
The ‘preparation’ offence thus makes it possible to criminalise individuals who have not 
committed (or, in the normal sense of the word, attempted) anything recognisable as a 
terrorist act, on the basis that an identifiable, individually innocuous action formed part of a 
pattern of behaviour which might in future have led to the commission of acts of terrorism. 
This can even be done when that pattern of behaviour has been interrupted by police 
intervention, potentially removing any basis for distinguishing between behaviours which 
would and would not ultimately have led to harmful acts—other than by accepting the 
interpretation advanced by prosecutors. 
 
Problems with preparatory offences are legion. Crucially, they risk criminalizing actions on 
the grounds of their potential outcomes—outcomes which may depend on a further 
intervening decision, if only the decision to persist in a chosen course of action. In Ashworth 
and Zedner’s words, ‘to hold a person liable now for her possible future actions ... is 
objectionable in principle’53. Ramsay argues further that such offences ‘discount the formal 
agency or personhood of offenders’54 by eliminating any time for reflection, criminalizing on 
the basis of ‘a will to commit dangerous acts’55 and effectively working on the basis that ‘[i]t 
is not the act but the actor that is dangerous’56. Hallevy’s extreme and draconian proposal to 
cut the ‘preparation’ knot by bringing preparatory activities under the heading of ‘attempt’ 
merits notice here. For Hallevy an attempt is formed when the suspect first decides to commit 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘Pashukanis’, above n 11, includes both these and the situational offences addressed below. 
Walker groups together inchoate, preparatory and situational offences as ‘precursor 
offences’: C Walker Terrorism and the law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
53 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 5, p 112. 
54 Ramsay ‘Pashukanis’, above n 11, p 202. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ramsay ‘Preparation offences’, above n 11, p 212. 
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an offence; once that decision has been acted on in any way ‘the attempted offense has been 
constituted’57. The putative offender can—and should—be prosecuted on the basis of the 
dangerousness he has already manifested: he ‘became a danger to society when he made his 
decision’58. The breadth and flexibility of the s5 preparation offence, in particular, evokes 
Hallevy’s logic: once a suspect is identified as harbouring dangerous intentions, any conduct 
in preparation for putting them into effect can be criminalized, even if investigation of this 
conduct does not yield ‘any blueprint, attack plan or endgame’59 (in the words of an officer 
involved in investigating the Farooqi group60). The offence facilitates prosecution of conduct 
that had not risen to the level of culpability, and as such falls into Edwards’s category of 
‘ouster’ offences61: offences defined so as to be provable against a much wider range of 
people than the offenders actually being targeted. The effect of such offences is to redefine 
the role of the courts: the courts are ousted from their role of determining guilt by being 
presented with offences defined in such a way that only one verdict is possible, while the 
actual wrong for which the accused is being prosecuted goes untested. 
 
Situational offences, finally, are a group of offence types which criminalise a state of affairs 
rather than an action: as well as offences where the actus reus is being present at a certain 
location, the term is being used here to include membership offences, possession offences 
and offences of omission, eg failure to inform. Situational offences, in effect, replace the 
commission of a wrongful act with the existence of a wrongful state of affairs—although, as 
Simester argues, the offence can be viewed in terms of an implicit wrongful act which was 
the precursor to that state of affairs (“[i]t is enough that there be some actus reus event over 
which the agent has control, that it is not impossible for the agent to prevent.”).62 The absence 
of any requirement to prove a positive action greatly strengthens the position of the 
prosecution. The factual element of the offence can be attested by the prosecution: if the 
arresting officer confirms that the accused was in fact in possession of an incriminating item 
                                                 
57 G Hallevy ‘Incapacitating terrorism through legal fight’ 3 Alabama Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties LR 87, p 105. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Quoted in H Carter ‘Jihad Recruiters Jailed After Anti-Terror Trial’ (2011) Guardian 9 
September. 
60 R. v Farooqi & Others, [2013 EWCA Crim 1649] But see the discussion of charging 
decisions under s5 in R. v Kahar and others [2016 EWCA Crim 568]. 
61 J Edwards ‘Justice denied: The criminal law and the ouster of the courts’ (2010) 30(4) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 725. 
62 A Simester ‘Prophylactic crimes’, in G Sullivan and I Dennis (eds.) Seeking Security: Pre-
empting the commission of criminal harms (Oxford: Hart, 2012), p 65. 
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(etc), this evidence will not generally be subjected to any credible challenge. The mental 
element of a situational offence is typically limited to a defence, eg that the accused was 
ignorant of the item’s presence or had a lawful purpose in taking possession of it. This tends 
to reverse the onus of proof, calling on the defence to bring evidence in support of the 
innocence of the accused rather than demanding that the prosecution prove guilt. In some 
cases the mental element of a situational offence may even be assimilated to the factual 
element. The offence of ‘Attendance at a place used for terrorist training’ introduced by the 
Terrorism Act 2006 (maximum sentence ten years) is taken as proven if a person attending 
the relevant place at the relevant time ‘could not reasonably have failed to understand’ that 
training connected with terrorism was taking place (Terrorism Act 2006, s8); given the right 
combination of circumstances, the mental element of the offence can simply be assumed.  
 
A partial reversal of the burden of proof, in situational offences, may be acceptable when the 
undesirable behaviour at which the law aims is, precisely, the existence of a particular state of 
affairs—eg the possession of illegal weaponry or membership of proscribed organisations. 
Whether simple possession of any article, however dangerous, should in principle be 
criminalised can be debated63. If that point is conceded, however, the mental element may in 
some situations be assumed64, or addressed by placing an evidential burden on the defence65. 
Reversing the burden of proof is more problematic where the state of affairs being addressed 
is innocuous in itself, but is criminalised as a precursor to other undesirable behaviour. While 
walking down the road carrying a toolbox is a harmless and lawful activity, carrying tools for 
use in a burglary in a public place constitutes the offence of ‘going equipped for stealing’ 
under the Theft Act 1968—and proof that the accused had the item in his or her possession is 
admissible as evidence that the item was intended for use in burglary or theft, placing an 
evidential burden on the defence (Theft Act 1968, s25). The scope of ‘non-constitutive’ 
offences such as these may reasonably cause concern66. 
 
                                                 
63 “this may be an appropriate point for the criminal law ... to demand that possession 
offences be enacted only if and insofar as they require proof of the probable danger of the 
article being used to cause serious harm”. A Ashworth ‘The unfairness of risk-based 
possession offences’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 237, p 256 (emphasis in 
original). 
64 Firearms Act 1968 s5. 
65 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 s28(3). 
66 “Carrying the tools of burglary is never itself harmful.” A Simester and A Von Hirsch 
‘Remote harms and non-constitutive crimes’ 28 Criminal Justice Ethics 89, p 90. 
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The main counter-terrorist situational offences are possession offences, specifically the 
offences created by sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000: possession of an article 
(any article) ‘in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is 
for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of 
terrorism’; and possession of a document or record ‘likely to be useful to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism’. Needless to say, the wording of these offences 
is extraordinarily broad. The scope of the s57 offence has been reduced slightly by the ruling 
in Zafar and others v R.67 that the ‘a purpose connected with’ wording should be read as if it 
required a direct connection between the object possessed and the commission, preparation or 
instigation of terrorism. Even with this qualification, the offence is effectively one of 
arousing suspicion, giving the defence the burden of giving an account that will allay those 
suspicions. The burden of proof similarly lies with the defence in the case of s58 offences: it 
is up to the defence to allay suspicion by proving the existence of a reasonable excuse68. 
Moreover, in R. v G and J69 the House of Lords ruled that any such excuse must refer to a 
course of conduct that was in itself reasonable: a burglar, apprehended holding plans of the 
local police station and wrongly accused of terrorist activity, can be found guilty under s58 
regardless unless he can demonstrate that he had lawful reasons for holding that document. 
 
A situational offence is also at issue where a defendant can be charged with having remained, 
guiltily, silent, as in the case of the offence of failing to disclose to the police ‘as soon as 
reasonably practicable’ any information which might prevent an act of terrorism or lead to 
the arrest of a terrorist (Terrorism Act 2000, s38B (inserted by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, s117)). As with other situational offences, it will not be hard to satisfy a 
jury as to the factual element of the offence, given a sworn statement that the individual did 
in fact have the information; the mental element (i.e. the lack of a reasonable excuse for 
remaining silence) can also be assumed, subject to disproof by the defence. Offences such as 
this push Simester’s ‘event over which the agent has control’ formulation to its limit, 
                                                 
67 Zafar & Others v R. [2008 EWCA Crim 184] 
68 Compare Ramsay’s account of the s58 offence in terms of ‘vulnerable citizenship’: ‘Where 
the defendant is in possession of the sort of information that "of its very nature" raises 
suspicions about terrorism, he must be able to explain it; if he cannot, then he does not 
reassure others about their safety.’ Ramsay ‘Overcriminalization’, above n 11, p 283. But see 
also Tadros, above n 4, p 676: “the terms of the offense are so broad, and so obviously not 
wrongful in most instances, that it is difficult to see why much of the behavior falling within 
the scope of the offense needs to be excused.” 
69 R. v G, R. v J [2009 UKHL 13] 
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effectively making an actus reus out of the agent’s failure to resolve a culpable situation. 
Although the construction of non-disclosure as an offence can be defended70, the overriding 
impression is not of the criminalization of a wrongful act, but of the use of criminalization as 
a tool to interrupt a loosely-defined pattern of behaviour. 
 
What is against this law? What is this law against?  
 
Two closely-related themes recurred through the previous section: the refusal of definition 
and precision in defining identifiably wrongful conduct, in favour of legislation targeting 
loosely-defined and temporally extended patterns of behaviour ; and the utility of legislation 
designed on these lines for criminalization and prosecution purposes. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the impression of vagueness by design is not dispelled by s1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, in 
which ‘terrorism’ is defined with every appearance of precision. The definition of terrorism 
in the 2000 Act replaced the definition brought into law by the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Powers) Act 1974; this had defined terrorism laconically as “the use of violence 
for political ends, [including] any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any 
section of the public in fear”71. The much lengthier 2000 definition has three elements, which 
itemise the acts which can be identified as terrorism; state the political or other ideological 
motive which must underlie them; and specify the tactical purpose with which they are 
committed. 72 This third element (specifying the goal of influencing a government 
organisation or intimidating the public) does not need to be proved if the act included the use 
of firearms or explosives (Terrorism Act 2000, s1(3))73. 
 
Each element of the definition is problematic. Whether ideological motivation is necessarily 
an aggravating factor—elevating a crime of violence, or a mere threat of violence, to the rank 
                                                 
70 Farmer Making, above n 8, p 191. 
71 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Powers) Act 1974, s9(1). 
72 B Golder and G Williams ‘What is “Terrorism”? Problems of Legal Definition’ [2004] 
UNSW LJ 22 cites this definition as exemplifying ‘the problems of defining terrorism in a 
general, deductive manner’ (emphasis in original). See also J Rowe ‘The Terrorism Act 
2000’ [2001] CLR 527, C Walker ‘Briefing on the Terrorism Act 2000’ (2000) 12(2) 
Terrorism and Political Violence 1, C Walker Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
73 This has been described as “[a] unique and eccentric feature of the UK definition [of 
terrorism]” by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who recommended that 
the relevant clause be repealed; D Anderson The Terrorism Acts in 2013 (London: 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 2014), pp 88-90. 
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of terrorist offences74—is debatable75; nor is it clear that either intimidating the public or 
influencing the government has ever been central to terrorist activity76. As for the ‘act’ 
definitions, it is worth noting that the formulation ‘the use or threat’ precedes and applies to 
each of them—a formulation apparently derived from a definition used by the FBI77. 
Although not widely commented on at the time78, this was a major innovation. While the ‘use 
or threat’ formulation is not unfamiliar in English criminal law79, the range of the activities 
specified in the 2000 Act made it particularly powerful here: threatening to endanger life or 
threatening to create a risk to health and safety (among much else) could henceforth be 
classified as an act of terrorism in its own right. This is a striking extension of the concept of 
terrorism, both in temporal scope and in the range of activities covered by it. If the threat of 
an action is just as much an act of terrorism as the action itself, the criminalisation of the act 
can clearly not be justified by harm done or even by an appeal to the wrongfulness of the act 
in itself, unless on the basis that a threat of harm is inherently wrong80. 
 
At issue here are two separate shifts in the definition of terrorism, as compared with the 1974 
definition. Detonating a bomb that causes £700 million of property damage (as in Manchester 
in 1996) or kills 22 people (as in Manchester in 2017) is unquestionably a harmful and 
wrongful act, and as such can be caught by the 1974 Act’s reference to ‘violence’. The 1974 
                                                 
74 The terrorist motive is thus “an aggravation of blameworthiness which justifies a special 
criminalization regime”; Lacey, above n 8, p 153. 
75 “The fact that a person kills with a political purpose may exacerbate the wrongness of their 
conduct or it may ameliorate or even justify attacking others, depending on the quality of the 
purpose and the quality of the act done in service of it.” Hodgson and Tadros, above n 4, pp 
507-8. 
76 See E Kurtulus ‘Terrorism and fear: do terrorists really want to scare?’ Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, online ahead of publication, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2017.1329080. But compare 
B Saul Defining ‘Terrorism’ to Protect Human Rights (2006) FRIDE Working Paper 20, p 
15: “it is inherent in the term ‘terrorism’ that any definition must reflect that some person, or 
group of people, felt terror or were intended to feel terror. Otherwise, the term becomes 
disassociated from its linguistic origin and its ordinary or plain textual meaning.” (emphasis 
in original). 
77 Walker ‘Briefing’, above n 72, p 9. 
78 The power of the ‘use or threat’ formulation is emphasised by Gareth Peirce in E Fekete 
‘The Terrorism Act 2000: An interview with Gareth Peirce’ (2001) 43(2) Race and Class 95. 
Walker ‘Briefing’, above n 72, notes the phrasing but downplays its significance.   
79 Statutory definitions of riot, violent disorder and affray hinge on the use or threat of 
unlawful violence (Public Order Act 1986, ss 1-3). 
80 Compare Alexander and Ferzan, above n 5, p 10: “A retributivist case for punishing 
inchoate crimes ... ultimately must rest on the premise that intending a future culpable act is 
itself a culpable act.” 
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definition effectively starts from a group of actions which would have constituted criminal 
offences in any case, by virtue of their harmful effects, then demarcates a politically-
motivated subset of those offences as especially blameworthy acts of ‘terrorism’81. By 
contrast, the 2000 Act’s definition tends to define terrorism primarily in terms of wrongful 
rather than harmful conduct, and in terms of patterns of behaviour rather than discrete acts.  
 
These offences share another, curious attribute: they all depend on the initial ascription of 
terrorism to the accused. The clauses in the 2000 Act which purport to define terrorism allow 
for counter-terrorist powers to be invoked both broadly and selectively. Among the 
counter-terrorist prosecutions documented by the CPS is the case of Ryan McGee, a vocal 
racist82 who built a viable bomb. McGee was prosecuted under the Terrorism Act, but only 
under s58 (possession of information potentially useful to terrorists); his bomb-making 
activities were dealt with by a charge under the Explosive Substances Act 1883. He was 
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the explosives charge, with a twelve-month 
sentence for the s58 charge, to run concurrently83. Terrorism—as defined in the 2000 Act—
encompasses the making of politically-motivated threats of serious violence involving 
explosives. What qualifies as an action in preparation for such an act is undefined in law, but 
amateur bomb-making carried out by a political extremist would seem to qualify. Presumably 
the reason that McGee’s actions were not constructed as terrorism is simply that they had not 
initially been viewed as ‘terrorism’, or the suspect as a ‘terrorist’: according to news reports, 
the Crown Prosecution Service declined to bring ‘preparation’ charges case on the grounds 
that ‘it was never McGee’s intention to use the device for any terrorist or violent purpose’84. 
A suspect’s intentions must be reconstructed from a range of evidence, including patterns of 
behaviour apparently directed towards realising them as well as—or to the exclusion of—
first-person testimony; compare R. v Tabbakh85, in which the defendant’s disavowal of any 
                                                 
81 “the ‘acts of terrorism’ which form the ostensible object of public concern ... are acts which 
are already proscribed.” Lacey In search, above n 8, pp 152-3. 
82 V Dodd ‘Soldier jailed for making nailbomb avoids terror charge’ (2014) Guardian 28 
November. 
83 Crown Prosecution Service (2014) ‘Soldier who made nail bomb jailed for two years’ 28 
November; online at 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/soldier_who_made_nail_bomb_jailed_for_two_ye
ars/> (last accessed 11/7/2017) 
84 Ibid. 
85 R. v Tabbakh [2009 EWCA Crim 464] 
 - 23 - 
terrorist purposes (in assembling a rudimentary and non-viable device) was disregarded86. 
Greene notes the opacity of subjective intention: ‘the label of “terrorist” may facilitate the 
inference of intention’87. The risk is that, rather than labelling following the classification of 
an offence according to its definition, the classification of the offence—and the charges 
brought—are determined by ascriptive labelling of the suspect. 
 
Terrorism in the law is effectively defined as a pattern of behaviour which it is vitally 
important to disrupt; which can only reliably be identified by specialists in counter-terrorism; 
and which can be identified by those experts in the absence of any identifiable wrongful act 
or any proven guilty intent. The effects of this built-in reliance on administrative discretion 
are potentially grave: ‘in practical terms the outcome is no different than if terrorism is not 
defined at all’88. The logic of the additional offences created since 2000, with their focus on 
the inchoate, preparatory and situational, follows from the original definition: these are not 
laws that criminalise identifiable wrongful acts, but laws that make it possible to use 
criminalisation as a tool for selectively pre-empting potential future acts.  
 
Law, counter-terrorism, counter-law 
 
These peculiarities of counter-terrorist legislation map surprisingly well onto the archetypal 
model of law developed above, albeit in negative. Knowability is a key feature of law as a 
guide to behaviour. Reliance on prosecutorial discretion in such a fundamental matter as the 
application of the label of ‘terrorist’ is unsatisfactory, particularly when the labelling is 
retrospective. Both preparatory and situational offences also fall short in this respect. A law 
prohibiting the possession of articles which might subsequently be presented as useful for the 
commission of an act of violence, or the commission of acts which might subsequently be 
presented as having been preparatory to what might have been a future act of violence, is not 
                                                 
86 Discussed in Macdonald, above n 4. 
87 Greene, above n 4, p 790. 
88 Greene, above n 4, p 791. 
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a law whose scope can be reliably known. The rule of law demands that the scope of terrorist 
offences should be knowable in advance89. 
 
Followability is also problematic, and not only to the extent that it is dependent on 
knowability. The ‘glorification’ and ‘encouragement’ offences effectively prohibit 
communicative acts which might later be presented as having had a tendency to encourage 
potential future acts of violence, even if no violence or even encouragement had taken place. 
Someone who may at some future date be charged with breaking these laws may choose to 
regulate her behaviour so as to reliably avoid it, but only by conforming her behaviour to the 
precise requirements of the offence. To avoid the charge of glorifying terrorism, in other 
words, does not require choosing not to glorify terrorism; rather, it requires the affirmative 
act of a clear and detailed disclaimer. A law that hedges lawful and harmless conduct about 
with additional requirements violates the spirit of followability. We may recall that the 
Control Order regime was also widely criticised—and individual control orders overturned—
for placing suspects under conditions which impinged on their liberty to the point of not 
being practically followable, in the sense of allowing a free choice to obey90: again, the 
identification of an individual as a terrorist suspect placed her under specific positive 
obligations in respect of a broad area of life. 
 
Of these four demands, justifiability is perhaps the one which contemporary counter-terrorist 
legislation meets most effectively; appellate rulings have clarified (and restricted) the scope 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 s57 offence (Zafar & Others v R.91) and the recklessness element 
of the Terrorism Act 2006 s2 offence (Faraz v R.92), as well as querying the definition of 
terrorism itself (R. v Gul93). (However, clarification has effectively extended the reach of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 s57 offence (R. v G and J94).) That said, the possibility of justification is 
limited when provisions are drafted so as to leave no room for challenge, as in the Terrorism 
                                                 
89 “as a matter of law an act ought to be identifiable as terrorist and therefore criminal at the 
time it is committed”. Greene, above n 4, p 783. See also Duff: “The definition of any crime 
should ... specify something that could legitimately be classed as a public wrong for which 
the perpetrator should have to answer in a criminal court.” Duff ‘Perversions and subversions 
of criminal law’, in Duff et al Boundaries, above n 2, p 97. 
90 S Macdonald ‘ASBOs and Control Orders: Two Recurring Themes, Two Apparent 
Contradictions’ (2007) 60 Parliamentary Affairs 601. 
91 Zafar & Others v R. [2008 EWCA Crim 184] 
92 Faraz v R. [2012 EWCA Crim 2820] 
93 R. v Gul [2013 UKSC 64] 
94 R. v G, R. v J [2009 UKHL 13] 
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Act 2006 s8 ‘training’ offences. Further, justification is challenged directly when trials are 
held wholly or partly in camera95, or when individuals are not allowed to hear the evidence 
against them, as in the proceedings of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission96. 
 
Contemporary counter-terrorist legislation also breaks with the most fundamental 
requirement of Fuller’s morality of law, and of thinner concepts of the rule of law97: the 
requirement of universality. Failure to specify the conduct targeted fully necessitates reliance 
on prosecutorial discretion: some individuals are prosecuted for conduct answering to the 
offence descriptions and others not. The point generalises: some individuals live with the 
awareness that they are liable to be prosecuted for conduct which may appear to answer to 
the offence descriptions; others—a majority—can be confident that they will not. In effect, 
the law targets an identifiable minority, treating individuals within it ‘as objects of control 
rather than as citizens to be engaged with’98. Membership offences are particularly 
questionable under this heading: to proscribe an organisation associated with a particular 
community must necessarily impose a disproportionate burden, and risk of incrimination, on 
members of that community as compared to the general public, particularly when the 
decision to proscribe may be poorly grounded99. 
 
The rule of law gives citizens ‘domains of optional conduct’, secured with a ‘protective 
perimeter’ of individual rights100: I can do what I like as long as I do no wrong to anyone 
else, and what counts as doing wrong is defined by the rights which each person is deemed to 
have (bodily integrity, private property, freedom of speech etc). Once an individual has been 
identified as a potential terrorist, however, a vast range of behaviour comes under suspicion. 
Moreover, to the extent that labelling practices are predictable and patterned, individuals 
                                                 
95 As in the 2014 trial of Erol Incedal and Mounir Rarmoul-Bouhadjar on preparatory and 
possession charges; see discussion in L Zedner ‘Criminal justice in the service of security’, in 
M Bosworth, C Hoyle and L Zedner (eds.) The changing contours of criminal justice 
(Oxford: OUP, 2016), pp 159-61. 
96 D Kostakopoulou ‘How to do Things with Security Post 9/11’ (2008) 28 OJLS 317. 
97 Cf. Bingham’s formulation: ‘all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or 
private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively 
promulgated and publicly administered in the courts’ (T Bingham The Rule of Law (London: 
Allen Lane, 2010), p 8. Universality is also implicit in the quoted definition suggested by 
Ericson, above n 18. 
98 Tadros, above n 4, p 684. 
99 See discussion of the deproscription process in D Anderson The Terrorism Acts in 2015 
(London: Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 2016), pp 30-3. 
100 Simmonds, above n 23, p 104. 
 - 26 - 
belonging to those population groups which are disproportionately likely to be labelled will 
also find their activities affected, if only through the chilling effect of internalised suspicion. 
It is meaningless to say that the law protects freedom of expression or private property—let 
alone that it protects individual freedom of action—when it selectively penalises particular 
examples of free expression, property ownership and harmless behaviour. The legal regime 
under which a terrorist suspect—or someone who believes that she is liable to be viewed as a 
terrorist suspect—lives is one with no protected domain of optional conduct and no reliable 
rights. Counter-terrorist counter-law annuls the rule of law. 
 
Four counter-arguments to this conclusion suggest themselves. First, prosecutorial discretion 
may be invoked: artificial examples of potentially criminalizable actions—eating healthily101 
or wearing clean clothes102 considered as ‘conduct in preparation for giving effect’ to terrorist 
intentions—are and remain absurd, it is argued, because no prosecution of such conduct 
would ever get to court. Conversely (secondly), it may be argued that the guidance given by 
the law to individuals intent on terrorism is both knowable and followable: anyone preparing 
terrorist acts should stop. Moreover, even if the guidance offered to those individuals were 
overbroad, targeting pre-preparatory as well as truly preparatory actions, this would not 
deprive society of any useful or constructive activity and hence would not be regrettable. 
Third, the case for prosecutorial necessity may be urged: this is the argument that the 
activities targeted by counter-terrorist legislation, if allowed to proceed, pose so grave a risk 
to society as to necessitate the use of the criminal law with pre-emptive effect. (This and the 
first argument both in different ways evoke Macdonald’s ‘investigative efficiency’103 ideal-
type, which stresses the reliability of police investigators and their findings.) Lastly, it can be 
argued that the rule of law maintains an adequate—threshold—level of operation, even for 
individuals who may come under suspicion of terrorism; this position echoes Macdonald’s 
‘adversarial reliability’ ideal-type104, which stresses the reliability of the courts in processing 
fallible investigative findings. 
 
                                                 
101 Simester, above n 6362, pp 71-4. 
102 Hodgson and Tadros, above n 4, p 985. 
103 S Macdonald ‘Constructing a framework for criminal justice research: Learning from 
Packer’s mistakes’ (2008) 11 New CLR 257Macdonald, above n 103, p 272. 
104 Macdonald, above n 103 S Macdonald ‘Constructing a framework for criminal justice 
research: Learning from Packer’s mistakes’ (2008) 11 New CLR 257, p 281. 
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The ‘prosecutorial discretion’ argument reminds us, correctly, that criminal law ‘in the 
books’ is only one element of the process of criminalization and should not be studied in 
isolation105. However, the trust which we are invited to place in prosecutorial discretion is, by 
its nature, hard to validate. If we had perfect knowledge that unreliable and tenuous examples 
of ‘conduct in preparation’ would never get to court, we could also have perfect confidence 
that those examples that do get to court were reliable. In the absence of that knowledge—in 
the absence, among other things, of full data on unsuccessful and abandoned prosecutions as 
well as successes—we are being invited to take both propositions on trust. There is also the 
danger that normalising prosecutorial discretion ‘permits overcriminalization, which in turn 
encourages more discretion’, resulting in ‘an unwritten criminal “law” that consists only of 
enforcers' discretionary decisions’106. The remedy entrenches the problem: prosecutorial 
discretion may mitigate the worst effects of broad and vague legislative wording, but reliance 
on discretion takes the law in practice further away from the law in the books, and hence 
militates against knowability and followability. 
 
According to the ‘adequate guidance’ argument, even if the actions of potential terrorists are 
restricted more than is entirely necessary, this loss is by definition of no social value107. The 
problem with this argument is that it conflates the subjective (but unknowable) reality of an 
intentional state with intention imputed on the basis of observed statements and activities. In 
other words, once an individual has been identified—rightly or wrongly—as harbouring 
terrorist intentions, the breadth of the statutory offences throws suspicion on a wide range of 
that individual’s acts, particularly acts intended to advance a ‘political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause’ (in the words of the 2000 Act). Moreover, a similar effect operates for 
putatively suspicious individuals themselves: the effect of the legislation is to create a 
chilling effect, tending to discourage and delegitimise activities, and the expression of views, 
that might (at a later date) be regarded as (having been) suspicious. This is the case both for 
those individuals who have fallen under suspicion for good reason and for the much larger 
group who fear being wrongly or falsely accused. 
                                                 
105 Lacey: “criminal law can and should be understood as part of an integrated process of 
criminalization incorporating all stages from the articulation of offences through 
investigation, diversion, prosecution, trial, sentencing, the royal prerogative, and the 
execution of punishment.” Lacey In search, above n 8, pp 14-15 (emphasis in original). See 
also Waddington, above n 32. 
106 Stuntz, above n 13, pp 579-80. 
107 See discussion in Ramsay ‘Preparation offences’, above n 11, p 220. 
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The ‘prosecutorial necessity’ argument again recalls us to the law in practice. If McGee was 
not charged with a preparation offence where Tabbakh108 was—receiving a sentence of seven 
years to McGee’s two—this does not mean that the law looks more kindly on a white racist 
who succeeds in makes a bomb than on an Islamist who fails to do so; it simply means that 
prosecutors, with the information and intelligence available to them, took the view that 
McGee’s bomb-making was not part of a pattern of behaviour that would eventually have led 
to terrorism, while Tabbakh’s attempted bomb-making was. Similarly, if a suspect is found 
guilty of preparation for terrorism on the basis that he had had incriminating conversations 
with undercover police officers109, or that he had expressed willingness to use his position of 
employment for terrorist purposes110, this does not mean that people are being convicted of 
terrorist offences on the basis of little more than loose talk. On the contrary, it can be argued, 
what this brings home to us is the necessity of a law drafted flexibly enough to make it 
possible to convict dangerous individuals such as Tabbakh, Farooqi and Karim, even when 
they have not furnished prosecutors with any discrete and definite actus reus. 
 
The problem with this argument is that, even if we assume that its factual basis is correct, the 
original critique is not touched by it. Any legislation worded loosely enough to be used in this 
selective and instrumental way will, by the same token, be worded too loosely to be either 
fully knowable or effectively followable, by those individuals who fall (or are seen as likely 
to be fall, or believe themselves likely to fall) under suspicion of terrorist activities or 
sympathies. As for whether such a deviation from the rule of law might be an acceptable 
price to pay for increased security from terrorism, the point is to name the price: in this case, 
the awareness that the law is less effectively universal (hence more discriminatory) than it 
had been—and, as it applies to a minority of people, less effectively knowable, followable 
and justifiable. Trading the security of the majority against the rights of the minority in this 
way can surely not be acceptable111. 
 
According to the ‘adequate threshold’ argument, lastly, terrorist suspects do not live outside 
the rule of law: it and its associated procedures and guarantees offer their protections to all 
                                                 
108 See nn 8382-7 above and accompanying text. 
109 R. v Farooqi & Others, [2013 EWCA Crim 1649] 
110 R. v Karim, [2011 EWCA Crim 2577] 
111 See Waldron, above n 4, especially pp 200-4. 
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who need them, terrorist suspects included. There is, still, no punishment without a crime to 
justify it and no crime without a law to define it; procedural justice extends to terrorist 
suspects on trial, and if their conduct is genuinely unproblematic they will not be convicted. 
As for the potential terrorist suspect who has not been—and may never be—in contact with 
the criminal justice system, she knows (as a citizen of a law-bound society) that the law 
leaves her free to act in any way he or she pleases, as long as other people’s rights are not 
infringed. However, she also knows that it would be advisable to avoid doing anything, 
possessing any item, attending any location, acquiring any information, advocating any 
action, making any statement, failing to disown any statement by a third party or failing to 
pass any information to the police where this action, item, attendance, information, statement 
or non-statement might be presented as being preparatory to, supportive of or otherwise 
related to terrorism. For anyone who is (or believes herself to be) liable to fall under 
suspicion of involvement in terrorism, counter-terrorist prohibitions overshadow a substantial 
area of social and political life. (This consideration also makes the guarantees available to the 
terrorist suspect within the system considerably less substantial.) Crucially, the precise extent 
and boundaries of the area of life within which behaviour may potentially be found 
suspicious are undefined, meaning that in effect its scope is unlimited.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Counter-terrorist legislation since 2000 has been designed for the selective criminalization of 
individuals deemed to be engaging in patterns of behaviour labelled as related to terrorism, so 
as to interrupt those patterns of behaviour and pre-empt the commission of anything rising to 
the level of a terrorist act. By the same token, it has developed as a body of law that 
effectively applies to a minority but not to the majority; that criminalizes behaviour, by those 
who are of interest to counter-terrorist investigators, in terms so broad and so loose as to give 
minimal guidance to those individuals; that frequently requires suspects to take positive 
action to demonstrate conformity with the law; and that is drafted to offer minimal handholds 
for appeal and challenge. In short, the law deviates—by design and not merely in practice—
from the rule of law’s values of universality, knowability, followability and justifiability. 
 
What is to be done? The foregoing critique is consistent with—and hopefully adds normative 
weight to—Zedner’s critique of the ‘terrorizing’ of criminal justice and her proposed tenets 
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for dealing with terrorist offences within the ‘criminal justice model’112. We might add that 
the criminal law should, in Duff’s terms, deal honestly with those subject to it, defining as 
crimes only ‘public wrongs’113 that each person is in principle capable of recognising and 
free to avoid. Any future reform of counter-terrorist legislation should thus start from the 
principle of creating offences which preserve the equal freedom of the rationally and morally 
autonomous individuals subject to them, and which therefore adhere as far as possible to the 
four rule-of-law principles discussed above. This is in part a call for parsimony. The 1974 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Powers) Act, for all its faults, created only a handful of 
new offences (connected with membership or support of proscribed organisations)—and this 
element of the Act was described by the then Home Secretary as ‘for show’114. 
 
Deviation from rule of law values will sometimes be necessary, just as it is sometimes 
necessary to restrain a dangerous individual who has not yet committed a culpable act115. 
What is crucial is that any such deviation is openly acknowledged and justified; the pre-2000 
model of temporary legislation in response to a specific emergency—now discredited through 
over-extension—may be due for a revival116. Above all, there should be more awareness of 
the distinctness—to put it no more strongly—of the roles of policing and the criminal law117; 
legislation should not be used to give a legal armature to counter-terrorist policing. 
 
Lastly, this paper is offered as a contribution to two related projects. On one hand, the 
elaboration of concepts of legality and the rule of law can benefit from a demonstration of 
how they can be deployed in contemporary policy debates, providing normative resources for 
the critique of illiberal and authoritarian developments. On the other, the historicist, 
dialectical and pluralist critiques of the liberal legal model can ultimately be strengthened by 
                                                 
112 Zedner, above n 4 (‘tenets’ at p 119). 
113 Duff, above n 9089, p 110. 
114 R Jenkins A life at the centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p 393. 
115 ‘[D]angerousness and culpability are independent of one another, and each can be present 
in the absence of the other. We punish people because they are culpable, whereas we restrain 
people, when we do so, because they are dangerous.’ Alexander and Ferzan, above n 5, p 11. 
116 See Fenwick and Phillipson’s comparison of counter-terrorism post-1974 and post-2000 
(“the counter-terrorist scheme post-2000 ... is more extensive than in the worst years of Irish 
terrorist violence”). H Fenwick and G Phillipson ‘Legislative over-breadth, democratic 
failure and the judicial response: fundamental rights and the UK’s anti-terrorist legal policy’, 
in Ramraj et al, above n 4, p 459. 
117 “The distinction between law and police is therefore stark and fundamental ... The ideal of 
the law state was defined against the reality of the police state.” Dubber ‘Preventive justice’, 
above n 13, p 63. 
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acknowledgment of the power and relevance of the norms they critique. Let liberal ideals of 
legality be subjected to critical scrutiny, returning them to their historical context and 
drawing out their blind spots and contradictions—but let them be attacked at their strongest 
points as well as their weakest, engaging with the critical and emancipatory power that those 
ideals have. Let us look not merely to the negation of the liberal model but to the preservation 
of its positive content, in and through its ultimate formal supersession. 
